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INTRODUCTION
After the Great East Japan Earthquake took place in Fukushima in 
2011, Japan abandoned nuclear power plants. However, it now plans to 
reactivate them. 
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) establishes 
regulations via ministerial ordinances to achieve statutory goals. Cases 
before several district courts seek to know whether the government’s grant 
of permission to reactivate nuclear power plants is arbitrary and 
capricious.
This Article examines issues pertaining to the grant of permission for 
the establishment of nuclear power plants and considers cases on the 
matter, because administrative discretion results in important 
developments in environmental law from a comparative law perspective. 
It is important to examine the decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court 
on administrative discretion in Japan, U.S. environmental law, and several 
cases concerning the establishment of nuclear power plants in Japan.
I. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CASE IN JAPAN
Most recently, the judiciary reviewed the reactivation of the nuclear 
power plant in 2017. Accordingly, this section looks at the decision of the 
High Court in the 2017 case. The Osaka High Court1 rejected the request 
for a temporary injunction against the operation of a nuclear power plant 
that the government had closed down after the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. A newspaper reported this case dramatically, which shows the 
influence of this case on decisions of other inferior Courts.2
A. Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Case in 2017
The Takahama Nuclear Power Plant started operations in 1985 after 
the government granted permission to operate it in 1980. The Great 
Earthquake caused the release of a massive radioactive substance in 2012, 
after the nuclear power plant melted down and a hydrogen explosion 
occurred. This incident caused nuclear power plants to stop operations one
by one. Unit 4 of the Takahama nuclear power plant stopped in July 2011, 
                                                                                                            
1. Osaka Koto Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] March 28, 2017, Heisei 28 (ra) 
no. 677, 2334 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 4 (Japan).
2. FUKUI SHIMBUN ONLINE, Genpatsu sashitome sosho [Injunction case of 
nuclear power reactor] (Sept. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/H9DX-8H37. See also
Takahama reactors may soon restart after court overturns injunction, JAPAN 
TIMES (May 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/R3KT-GQUN.
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followed by Unit 3 in February 2012. In 2012, the Japanese parliament 
amended the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Materials, Nuclear 
Fuel Materials, and Reactors.3 In order to reactivate the nuclear power 
plant, an applicant must submit a request for permission to the Nuclear 
Regulation Authority (NRA) to see if it meets safety standards and to make 
an application to modify facilities to meet the new standards.
In July 2013, the Kansai Electric Power Co. submitted an application 
to modify the facility and sought permission to plan the construction and 
correction of the nuclear plant according to the safety regulations for Units 
3 and 4.4
In December 2014, local residents brought an action to seek a 
temporary injunction against the operation of Units 3 and 4. They argued 
that their interests were based on personal rights in Article 13 of the 
Constitution and sought the exclusion of interference because nuclear 
contamination would cause damage to the lives and health of local 
residents.5
The Fukui District Cour6 accepted and granted a temporary injunction. 
Units 3 and 4 stopped operations in February 2016. The Osaka High Court 
vacated it and focused on NRA safety standards. The Osaka High Court 
admitted that safety regulations should prevent a “remote” possibility of 
concrete danger, but noted that while reviewing a concrete risk of 
substantial danger, the reviewing Court would see if the danger is 
controlled well enough that it may be ignored by socially conventional 
wisdom. The Osaka High Court thought the NRA safety standards were 
reasonable enough to achieve the level of safety required for a nuclear 
power plant to operate.7
Although this case was considered civil litigation, its decision was 
similar to a decision in an administrative adjudication. In Japan, residents 
have two routes to seek an injunction against a nuclear power plant. As 
shown in the civil case, one way is for the local residents to pursue civil 
                                                                                                            
3. Kakugenryo Bussitsu, Kakunenryou Bussitsu oyobi Gensiro no kiseini 
kansuru Houritsu, Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear 
Fuel Material and Reactors, currently Law No. 42 of 2016. (Japan).
4. Takahama nuclear power plants are composed of four units. Unit 1 started 
in 1974, and Unit 2 started in 1975. Unit 3 and Unit 4 started in 1985. KANSAI 
ELECTRIC POWER, Nuclear Power Information on Units 3 and 4 of Takahama 
Power Station (List of Topics), https://perma.cc/2BR5-XWZM.
5. The argument for personal rights includes the right to health, derived from 
their right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” NIHONKOKU KENPŌ 
[KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], Nov. 3, 1946, art. 13 (Japan).
6. Fukui Chiho Saibansho [Fukui Dist. Ct.] April, 14, 2015, Heisei 26 (yo) 
no. 31, 2290 HANREIJIHOU [HANJI] 13 (Japan).
7. Justin McCurry, Fukushima operator can restart nuclear reactors at 
world's biggest plant, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/MS4H-
76B3.
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litigation alleging that permission granted to a nuclear power plant would 
infringe on their personal rights protected by the Constitution. The other 
method is administrative litigation, by which they can seek the revocation 
of permission granted to the nuclear power plant.
The civil case shows drastic reforms after the Great Earthquake in 
2011 and followed the Ikata decision that is discussed in Section II(D),
which alleviated the burden of proof on local residents in administrative
litigation.
In the Ikata decision, the Supreme Court noted an imbalance of 
scientific knowledge between electric companies and residents. Thus, the 
Ikata decision noted that, in general, a plaintiff must prove administrative 
adjudication is unreasonable, but in this case, the Atomic Energy 
Commission is obligated to prove concrete standards for review and 
procedure by substantial proof and materials. If an administrative agency 
can’t perform its duty, the unreasonableness of administrative adjudication 
is presumed. The Osaka High court followed the Ikata decision, and noted 
further: If an administrative agency meets its burden of proof, the burden 
shifts to plaintiffs to prove uncertainty.
Although the term “remote” in this decision means “just in case,” the 
Osaka High Court held that rather than a remote danger, a substantial and 
concrete danger was necessary. The decision led to the formation of the 
myth of absolute safety of the nuclear power plant. After 2011, this myth 
was discarded, and the government implemented detailed safety measures 
based on experiences of serious accidents. The judiciary can no longer 
focus on a “remote possibility.”8
Judicial control of administrative discretion is not confined to granting 
permission for the establishment or reactivation of nuclear power plants. 
Thus, before analyzing any further, it is necessary to review cases of 
administrative discretion in other fields. Section II illustrates that the 
development of administrative discretion in Japan is not as unique as non-
Japanese researchers assume it to be.
B. Missiles from North Korea
After the High Court decision, Units 3 and 4 were reactivated in May 
and June, 2017, respectively. Local residents persevered and sought an 
injunction by other means. In March 2018, the Osaka District Court 
dismissed complaints that missiles from North Korea were likely to attack 
                                                                                                            
8. Shigenori Matsui, T-Rex, Jurassic Park and Nuclear Power: Nuclear 
Power Plants and the Courts After the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, 42 WILLIAM 
& MARY ENVTL. LAW & AND POLICY REV. 145, 182-183 (2017).
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the Takahama nuclear power plant and cause serious, extensive 
radioactive contamination in Kansai. The judge explained that the danger 
was not so imminent that it was necessary to stop operations of Units 3 
and 4 of the nuclear power plant.9 Local residents now seek temporary 
injunction orders by bringing different arguments.10
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION IN JAPAN
Administrative discretion is an important part of the study of the
nuclear power plant permission case. It also raises important issues from 
a comparative law perspective.11
Much controversy surrounds administrative discretion to establish 
administrative standards and make administrative dispositions. In abstract 
cases, the legislature provides general language in the statutes regarding 
standards for disposition for the general public. The legislature has 
established administrative agencies with a limited power to create 
administrative regulations within their fields of expertise.12 It is still unclear 
how administrative agencies interpret statutes through ministerial 
ordinances. It is also unclear how administrative dispositions should be 
rendered or if permission for applications should be granted in specific 
cases.
Before World War II, German law greatly influenced Japanese law. At 
that time, administrative law focused on limiting the governmental power 
that infringed upon the interests and freedoms of the people. There were two 
mainstream theories used to recognize administrative discretion in Japan. 
The first theory focused on administrative discretion where administrative 
agencies interpreted the text of the statutes in concrete cases.13 The second
theory focused on the choices of administrative agencies from several 
administrative dispositions provided by statute.14
                                                                                                            
9. Osaka Chiho Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] March, 30, 2018. Kanden 
Takahama Genpatsu 4 gouki ga saikadou, Restart Takahama nuclear reactor 
Kansai Electric Power Co., NIKKEI SHIMBUN (May 17, 2017), https://perma.cc
/JZ4U-PFHF.
10. Utility eyes NRA screening nod for new nuclear reactor in Shimane, THE 
ASAHI SHIMBUN (Feb. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/77W5-BPT3.
11. UGA KATSUYA, GYOSEIHO TEKISUTO [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT] 161
(Yuhikaku 2012); Y. SHIBAIKE, GYOSEIHO [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 63 (Yuhikaku
2016); HASHIMOTO HIROYUKI & SAKURAI KEIKO, GYOSEIHO [ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW] 151-52 (Kobundo 2016).
12. UGA KATSUYA, GYŌSEIHŌ TEKISUTO [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT] 141-
46 (Yuhikaku 2012).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 163-64.
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After World War II, administrative law was influenced by U.S. theories. 
Japanese administrative law mixed U.S. and German administrative law
theories.
This Article examines the decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court in 
terms of important environmental law doctrines in combination with U.S. 
theories of environmental law.
A. Rule-making and Lawmaking Power in Japan
Unlike the presidential veto power in the U.S., the Japanese Prime 
Minister has no legal power to reject a bill submitted by the parliament 
upon his signature. The parliament cannot give the administrative agency 
carte blanche in lawmaking power because Article 41 of the Japanese 
Constitution gives sole lawmaking power to the Diet.15 When the Diet 
leaves a gap in a statute, the administrative agency is expected to fill the 
gap.16 The grounds for the Diet to delegate its lawmaking power to an 
administrative agency are found in Article 73(6), which empowers the 
agency to “enact cabinet orders in order to execute the provisions of this 
Constitution and of the law. However, it cannot include penal provisions 
in such cabinet orders unless authorized by such law.”17 Accordingly,
Article 73(6) authorizes the Diet to delegate provided that its purpose is 
clear, the standard is fixed, and the scope of delegation is clearly limited.18
The Constitution considers the discretion limited if the Diet has the ability 
to withdraw or modify the delegation at any time.
In a famous administrative regulatory case involving a Japanese 
sword, one citizen filed for permission to register a western style sword to 
have in his home.19 A Japanese statute prohibits people from having guns 
and swords in their home unless applicant registers them as “beautiful 
museum objects.”20 The administrative regulations provide an exception 
for Japanese swords but not for western style sabers.
The Japanese Supreme Court held that its delegation was 
constitutional.21 Some swords may have cultural value as museum objects. 
Japanese people cannot own swords, but the statute provided an exception 
                                                                                                            
15. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 41 (Japan).
16. UGA, supra note 12, at 143.
17. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 73(6) (Japan).
18. TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI 
TAKAHASHI, & KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI,KENPŌ II [CONSTITUTION II] 
76–78,418 (Yuhikaku 2012) .(Japan) [hereinafter NONAKA ET AL.II].
19. Saikō Saibansho [Supreme Court] Feb. 1, 1990, Showa 63 (Gyo tsu) no. 
163, 44(2) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 369 (Japan).
20. Id.
21. Id.
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in the register system for the reservation of swords. The Japanese Court 
reviewed the purpose and the meaning of the statute and held that the 
Director General of the Agency for Cultural Affairs had regulation 
authority. In doing so, the Director’s authority was limited to the appraisal 
standards for Japanese swords and what is considered valuable as 
registered beautiful museum objects.
In another case, the Japanese Supreme Court weighed in on a statute 
involving child-rearing allowance.22 The statute states that the Government 
provides support for children whose parents are divorced or whose father 
passes away.23 Administrative regulations support the mother who bears a 
child without legal marriage unless there is legal acknowledgement by the 
father.24 Under the Japanese Civil Code, legitimacy of a child is legally 
presumed when there is a married couple or when there is an unmarried 
mother who bears a child. 25 However, legitimacy is not presumed in 
circumstances involving an unmarried father and a child. The statute for 
child-rearing allowance only provides support for children of divorce, not
for children of an unmarried couple.
The government denied the application for a child who was legally 
acknowledged by the father. The Japanese Supreme Court determined the
administrative agency regulations that excluded children who were legally 
acknowledged by their fathers were illegal. Further, the Court found the 
distinction between married but divorced mothers and unmarried mothers
to be unreasonable.26
B. Definition of Administrative Discretion in Japan
Administrative discretion is the authority of an administrative agency 
to set regulatory standards or make administrative decisions within the 
scope set forth in its enabling legislation or other statutes. The grounds for 
administrative discretionary power are agency expertise and policy 
judgment. Discretion is exercised in administrative rule-making and 
administrative planning. There are two types of administrative planning: 
One is legally binding, such as land readjustment projects, and the other 
                                                                                                            
22. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 31, 2002, Heisei 8 (Gyo tsu) no. 42, 56(1) 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 246 (Japan).
23. Jidou Fuyou Teate Hou [Child Rearing Allowance Law], Law No. 238 of 
1961 (Japan), art. 4(1)V.
24. Jidou Fuyou Teate Hou Sikou Rei [Enforcement Order of the Child 
Rearing Allowance Law], Ordinance No. 405 of 1961, art.1-2(3) (rev. 2008).
25. MINPO [CIVIL CODE] Law No. 89 of 1896 (Japan), art. 772.
26. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 31, 2002, Heisei 8 (Gyo tsu) no. 42, 56(1) 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 246 (Japan).
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type serves only as a guideline with no legally binding power, such as a 
highway improvement project. If administrative plans restrict rights or 
establish duties of a citizen, they are legally binding and need to be 
established by statute. If not, they do not have legal binding power. 
The scope of such discretion is subject to the terms set forth in the 
agency’s enabling statutes and, in some cases, leads to judicial review
because of intentional or unintentional “uncertainty” in the term.
For example, in 1997, Japan’s Supreme Court reviewed the term 
“reasonable price,” which was referenced in Article 71 of the Compulsory 
Purchase of Land Act.27 In this case, the Land Expropriation Committee 
decided upon the compulsory purchase of a particular parcel of privately 
owned land. The land had some uncertainty with regards to the existence 
of a lease tenant contract and the ratio of leasehold tenant rights, and the 
committee ultimately decided upon a 40% leasehold tenant right. The 
Court stated the following:
[The Court] should not examine or judge whether or not the 
Expropriation Committee has abused its discretionary power 
when making a determination on compensation, but rather, the 
Court should determine a fair amount of compensation as of the 
time of the committee’s determination, objectively, and if there is 
any difference between the amount of compensation determined 
by the Court and that determined by the committee, the Court 
should declare the committee’s determination to be illegal and fix 
a fair amount of compensation.28
The Court held that the “reasonable price” of the compulsory purchase 
should be objectively fixed and appropriately determined based on the 
experience of reasonable people and socially accepted ideas. 29
Accordingly, the Court determined that the term “reasonable price,” as set 
forth in the agency’s regulations authorizing the committee’s work, did 
not give such broad discretion to the Land Expropriation Committee. Not 
reviewing whether administrative adjudication is arbitrary and capricious, 
the Court invalidated the Land Expropriation Committee’s price of 
compensation.
                                                                                                            
27. Tochi Shuyo hou [The Compulsory Purchase of Land Act], Law No. 219 
of 1951.
28. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 28, 1997, Heisei 11 (Gyo tsu) no. 11, 
51(1) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 147 (Japan).
29. Id. 
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C. Classic Theories of Administrative Discretionary Power in Japan
In Japan, the legislature authorizes an administrative agency to 
exercise its power through statutes. In some cases, the terms of the statute 
are unclear. The ambiguity in the statutory authority includes how and 
when administrative discretionary power is legally exercised. Generally, 
the notion of discretion has been characterized by its requirements 
(Youken). Accordingly, the effects of discretion (Kouka) have been related 
to the level of judicial review. There are also concepts of reviewable and 
non-reviewable discretionary power.30
To clarify this distinction, Kyoto University Professor Souichi Sasaki 
argued that administrative discretionary power was permitted in cases 
where an agency’s interpretation involves an element or requirement as 
provided by statute.31 Simply put, the agency is granted discretionary 
power to apply a condition or requirement to a fact (referred to as Youken 
Sairyou in Japanese). For example, the legislature provided general text in 
public servant law that prohibits the delinquency of public officials; 
however, it is unclear what kind of action by a public official would 
constitute “delinquency.” The administrative agency has the discretion to 
determine when a public official’s statement is “certain” and in doing so, 
may determine the grounds for discipline.
On the other hand, Professor Tatsukichi Minobe of Tokyo University 
stated that administrative agencies had broad discretionary power to either
select the procedure for such a disposition or not to decide at all. This 
theory is referred to as Kouka (Sentaku) Sairyou in Japanese. For example, 
in a public official’s disciplinary case, the agency would have 
discretionary power to choose between punitive dismissal, pay cuts, 
suspension, or a warning as punishment.
The theories of these two professors may differ in some cases and lead 
to similar conclusions in others. These ideas reflect the German public law 
theories at a time when public law focused on how to restrict the 
government’s infringement on the rights and protect freedoms of the 
people.32
Prior to World War II, Japanese public law scholars such as Sasaki 
and Minobe did not consider social rights in Japan. Thus, Minobe
approved of the unfettered discretionary power of an agency’s disposition 
as an independent power to provide for the beneficial interests of the 
                                                                                                            
30. UGA, supra note 11, at 163; SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 65-66; SAKURAI 
& HASHIMOTO, supra note 11, at 105-114.
31. Id.
32. Yuichiro Tsuji, Administrative Action and the Succession of Illegality, 67 
TSUKUBA J. L. & POL. 11, 14-19 (2016).
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people but rejected invasive administrative dispositions that restricted the 
freedom of the people.33
A 1961 Supreme Court decision shows that the distinction between the 
views of Sasaki and Minobe were blurred after the new Constitution was 
established in 1947.34 Here, the Supreme Court reviewed the disciplinary 
dismissal of a teacher in a public junior high school. The educational 
committee in the locale ordered him to move to a different school. The 
teacher argued that the committee’s disposition was illegal and chose to 
remain at the original school. This resulted in an order for disciplinary 
dismissal. The teacher brought suit to revoke the dismissal.
In this case, the educational committee convened for the disciplinary 
dismissal with only 30 minutes’ notice and did not open it to the public. The 
old Article 34(4) of the Educational Committee Act stated that venue, date, 
and agenda should be provided at least three days beforehand, except in an 
emergency. The issue was whether convening the committee for the 
disciplinary dismissal in this context constituted an “emergency.”
The Supreme Court supported the committee’s discretionary power to 
interpret this provision and determined that convening the committee was 
an emergency that did not require the three-day prior notice.35
Another illustrative case is the Alan McLean decision of 1978 in 
which John Alan McLean entered Japan as an English teacher on a one-
year visa in May 1969. 36 During his stay, he participated in a 
demonstration of a Japanese citizens’ group against the Vietnam War. 
After one year, he applied for an extension of stay for 120 days in May 
1970, but the Ministry of Justice denied his request.
The statute provided that the Ministry “can” permit the extension of a 
visa if it thinks it is appropriate and there is a valid reason. The Supreme 
Court held that the rights provided in Chapter 3 of the Japanese 
Constitution37 are guaranteed for non-Japanese people to whatever extent 
possible. The Ministry possesses the prerogative power to make decisions 
to approve visas and grant visa extensions, taking into account the 
subject’s political activities in Japan. The Ministry, therefore, retains 
broad discretion, and the Court will hold its decisions to be illegal only if 
                                                                                                            
33. UGA, supra note 11, at 164; SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 69-73; SAKURAI 
& HASHIMOTO, supra note 11, at 105-106.
34. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] April 27, 1961, Showa 34 (o) no. 851, 15(4) 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHŪ] 928 (Japan).
35. Id. 
36. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 4, 1978, Showa 50 (Gyo tsu) no. 120, 
32(7) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHŪ] 1223 (Japan).
37. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], Nov. 3, 1946, Ch. 3 
(Japan) (List of fundamental rights).
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the disposition is based on clearly erroneous and unreasonable findings of 
fact that lack validity under socially accepted common sense.
Following the Minobe theory, the Court denied discretionary power 
when an administrative disposition restricts rights or freedoms of the 
people. The Court decided, however, that the right to enter Japan or extend 
one’s visa is not a protected right for non-Japanese people.38
The Minobe and Sasaki theories illustrate extreme positions for 
administrative discretionary power. Today, mandatory discretion refers to 
what a reasonable person would decide based on common sense and 
socially acceptable values, subject to judicial review. The legality of 
unfettered discretionary power is subject to judicial review, while its 
validity for administrative disposition is not.39
D. Article 30 of the Japanese Administrative Case Litigation Act
Today, Article 30 of the Japanese Administrative Case Litigation Act 
(JACLA or Gyousei Jiken Soshouhou in Japanese) does not distinguish 
between these theories. 40 Article 30 gives the court power to vacate 
administrative adjudication when it is arbitrary and capricious. The Courts 
can revoke an original administrative disposition when it is made beyond 
the agency’s discretionary power or when there is an abuse of such power.
Japanese environmental law studies focus on cases in which 
administrative dispositions have been determined by the Courts to be
beyond the limits of discretionary power or an abuse of such power. It is 
very similar to U.S. environmental law studies, where U.S. Courts review
agency action under the arbitrary or capricious standard or review the fact-
finding of an administrative agency under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA). In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the United 
States Supreme Court reviewed whether an administrative agency decision 
made a clear error of judgment through all relevant factors.41
In Japan, administrative agencies exercise the following powers to 
make a disposition: (1) fact-finding, (2) interpretation of the requirements 
of disposition, (3) selection of procedures, and (4) timing.42 The Courts 
review only the legality, not the validity, of an administrative disposition. 
                                                                                                            
38. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 4, 1961, Showa 50 (Gyo tsu) no. 120, 
32(7) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHŪ] 1223 (Japan).
39. UGA, supra note 11, at 165.
40. Gyousei Jiken Soshouhou [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 
59 of 2015, art. 30 (Japan).
41. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
42. UGA, supra note 11, at 161-168; see also SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 78-
83; see also SAKURAI & HASHIMOTO, supra note 11, at 105-113.
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Administrative discretion, therefore, depends on the administrative 
agency’s flexible disposition based on its special expertise.43
In a 1982 decision, the Japanese Supreme Court reviewed Article 30 
of the JACLA.44 In this case, a real estate agent entered into a building 
contract with a contractor. The contractor asked the business entity of a 
specially equipped car to deliver building materials to the building 
location. The Vehicle Restriction Ordinance mandated that permission 
was needed before a specially equipped car could drive on the road to the 
construction site. Although the Nakano ward of Tokyo accepted the 
application to use the road, travel was not permitted for six months because 
residents living near the building formed a group opposing the 
construction, resulting in a conflict. The Nakano ward advised the 
applicants to bring the issue before the dispute mediation committee. The 
real estate agent brought action against the Nakano ward for damages 
caused by delayed permission to travel under the State Redress Act (Kokka 
Baishou hou). 45
The Court analyzed the permission requirement in the Vehicle 
Restriction Ordinance for traveling on the road with a specially equipped 
car and held that such permission was merely an act of confirmation with 
no discretionary power of the ward.46 The Court stated that this permission 
was allowed to include conditions for individual cases. This decision 
shows that administrative agencies may exercise their dispositions based 
on objective standards. The agency can exercise administrative 
discretionary power unless the Court finds the exercise to be arbitrary and 
capricious or so beyond the scope of such power that it is an abuse of 
power. The factors relevant to judicial review are violations of purpose, 
principles of equality, proportionality, and the infringement of the rights 
of citizens.
In a 1972 decision, the Supreme Court issued a ruling on Prime 
Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s economic policy for prices.47 The plaintiffs, 
residents of Osaka City, deposited money in a postal saving service. 
Because the consumer price index increased twenty-six percent from 1972 
to 1974, they argued that the value of their deposit decreased as a result of 
                                                                                                            
43. UGA, supra note 11, at 165; see also SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 82-83; 
see also SAKURAI & HASHIMOTO, supra note 11, at 111.
44. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 23, 1982, Showa 55 (o) no. 255, 36(4) 
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the actions of the Fair Trade Commission under the Prime Minister’s 
economic policy. The Court denied government responsibility under the 
State Redress Act, holding that the way economic policy is drafted and 
implemented is within the discretionary power and that political 
responsibility can be evaluated through elections.48
Administrative agencies exercise their discretionary power not only 
through policy-making but also through their expertise. In the case of 
nuclear energy plants, discretionary power might be more narrowly 
limited; on the other hand, it is possible to regard such power as part of a
judgment of future energy policy.
The Japanese judiciary may review an administrative disposition from 
the perspective of the administrative agency. It is similar to the approach 
under U.S. environmental law using the arbitrary and capricious standard, 
which is also called the “hard look approach.” 49 The judiciary uses
scrutiny to review administrative dispositions, but still defers to its 
judgment because of a certain expertise of the agency.50
In the Minamata disease decision, a notorious pollution case in Japan, 
the Chisso factory polluted a river with a compound called methyl mercury, 
causing disease via the food chain.51 Here, the government did not exercise 
its delegated power until the victims cried out. In 2004, the Japanese 
Supreme Court found the government liable under the State Redress Act. 
The Japanese Court explained that, based on the severe symptoms of the 
residents, the agency should have promptly acted to mitigate the pollution.
It issued a temporary injunction to stop further pollution. The victims in this 
case suffered from severe diseases and, as a result, were eligible to receive 
damages according to a decision made by the Pollution-Related Health 
Damage Certification Council (the Council).52
In 2013, one woman applied for damages utilizing the Minamata 
disease case findings, but the Council denied her request.53 The Japanese 
Court limited the discretionary power of the administrative agency to 
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confirm a pollution disease diagnosis under the Act on Compensation, etc. 
of Pollution-Related Health Damage.54 The Court permitted taking public 
health and safety into consideration in reviewing an administrative 
disposition.
The Court took a similar approach in the 1992 decision regarding the 
Ikata nuclear plant.55 In the Ikata decision, the Shikoku Electric Power 
Company planned to construct a nuclear power reactor plant in Ikata cho, 
part of the Ehime Prefecture. Shikoku applied to the Prime Minister for a 
permit under Article 2356 of the ex-Act on the Regulation of Nuclear 
Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material, and Reactors from May of 1972.
The government granted permission for construction in November of 
1972. In 1973, the plaintiffs sought revocation of the administrative 
disposition that had granted permission to build nuclear reactors under 
JACLA. They argued that such permission was substantively and 
procedurally illegal and therefore infringed upon public health and 
property rights.57
In 1992, the Japanese Supreme Court rejected the local resident’s 
arguments.58 The Ikata decision explained that the power of an administrative 
agency could be free and discretionary but not unfettered, since it is still 
under judicial review. Further, when disposition based on discretionary 
power infringes upon human health and safety, the judiciary will strictly 
review the disposition. The Court noted that it would respect the expertise 
of the administrative agency.59
In supporting its deference to the agency, the Court explained that the 
administrative agency examines the safety of reactor facilities including 
the technical capabilities as follows:
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[Safety is examined from] a multifaceted and comprehensive 
perspective, considering matters such as the engineering safety of 
the reactor facilities themselves, the radiation effect on the 
workers, neighboring residents and surrounding environment 
when the reactors are in normal operation, and the effect on the 
neighboring areas in the event of an accident, in connection with 
natural conditions of the planned site of reactors (e.g. the land 
features, nature of the soil, and weather), social conditions (e.g. 
population distribution), and the abovementioned technological 
capabilities of the person who is to install the reactors. This 
examination also covers matters concerning future forecasts.60
The Court continued:
[The examination] requires comprehensive assessment based on 
the latest scientific, expert, and technical knowledge of a 
considerably high level, not only in the field of nuclear 
engineering but also across a wide range of fields. Article 24 of 
the Regulation Act provides that in granting permission for the 
installation of reactors, the Prime Minister must hear in advance 
the opinion of the Atomic Energy Commission with respect to the 
application of the criteria provided in paragraph (1), item (iii) of 
said Article (limited to the part concerning technical capabilities) 
and in item (iv) of said paragraph, and respect such an opinion.61
The Court emphasized that the Prime Minister had respected the expert, 
scientific, and technical knowledge of the Atomic Energy Commission. In 
the meantime, the Court narrowed its discretion based on scientific expert 
perspectives in cases where nuclear reactor accidents occur and public 
health and safety are endangered. The judiciary still substantively analyzes 
commission review processes regarding specific safety standards. It also 
procedurally monitors the investigation, deliberation, and judgment 
processes of the commissions utilizing the latest scientific technologies.62
The Ikata decision of 1992 established a framework for the review of 
cases involving the safety of nuclear power reactors in Japan. The 
judiciary did not use the term scientific “discretion” in its decision, 
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probably because it was attempting to distinguish discretion based on
policy from that based on expertise.
Some Japanese environmental law studies regard the Ikata decision as 
a matter of policy-making discretion for future energy policy and as a 
decision-making process involving a third, independent, non-bureaucratic 
committee. In such cases, the judiciary does not make determinations from 
the perspective of the administrative agency.63
The Court also noted a burden of proof problem in the 1992 Ikata
decision. Typically, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that an 
administrative disposition related to the granting of permission should be 
revoked. This was a heavy burden for residents living near the power 
plant.64
Thus, the Court asked the administrative agency to prove the 
reasonableness of “the specific examination criteria employed in the 
investigation and deliberation by the Atomic Energy Commission, the 
Reactor Safety Examination Committee, the investigation, deliberation 
and assessment process, etc.” Thus, an administrative agency can be 
required to submit substantial evidence and materials. If it fails, the Court 
will presume that the agency assessment lacked reasonableness.65
The Court gave no indication in the Ikata case of whether the 
administrative agency did submit substantial evidence and materials, and 
it is still unclear whether or not its judgment was reasonable. The Court 
may deny administrative dispositions that are determined to be 
unreasonable but may uphold the dispositions of an administrative agency, 
in general, based on the scientific knowledge required for judicial 
review.66
The Ienaga textbook decision of 1993 reviewed the procedural aspects 
of administrative discretionary power.67 The Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science, and Technology, the Textbook Authorization Research 
Council (the “Textbook Council”), review textbooks for Japanese 
elementary and junior high schools for students aged seven to fifteen,
according to the Articles of the School Education Act (Gakkou Kyouiku 
hou). 68
                                                                                                            
63. UGA, supra note 11, at 165-167; SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 82-83; 
SAKURAI & HASHIMOTO, supra note 11, at 118-119.
64. UGA, supra note 11, at 325.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 16, 1993, SHOWA 61 (o) no. 1428, 47(5) 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 3483 (Japan).
68. Gakko Kyoiku Hou [School Education Act] (prior to the amendment by 
Act No. 48 of 1970), Art. 21(1), and 51 Former Textbook Authorization Ordinance 
(Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, Ordinance no. 4 of 1948), and the Former 
2019] NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTIVATION IN JAPAN 67
The Court found clear error in the decision-making process of the 
Textbook Council through its investigation, deliberation, and judgment 
processes. In the process of authorizing textbooks, certain reasonable 
discretionary power is given to the Ministry of Education due to its 
academic educational expertise.
In holding the administrative decision to be unlawful, the Court stated 
that clear mistakes could not be ignored. 69 The Court reviewed the 
Textbook Council’s screening process, which was based on the academic 
theories at that time, and overruled the decision rejecting the descriptions 
of the textbook. If the Minister of Education made its decision based on 
an error, it would be illegal under the State Redress Act.
E. Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion in Japan Today
A 1972 decision centered around a professional cleaner of septic tanks 
whose application for permission to operate a business for sewage 
treatment was denied.70 The applicant brought an action to revoke the 
administrative disposition denying the application. The Japanese Supreme 
Court vacated the Tokyo High Court’s decision and remanded the case for 
further proceedings.
The Court explained that the power to approve sewage treatment 
businesses was in the hands of the mayor, who had authority to approve 
them under the provisions of the Clean Act and the Clean Plan of the 
municipality. Sewage plans are the responsibility of municipalities, and 
approval of such a business is reviewed to ensure that sewage treatment is 
well managed. The Supreme Court recognized the power of the mayor to 
interpret the text of the Clean Act for permission purposes.
In a 1954 decision, the Court reviewed the disposition of a matter 
involving a student.71 A student in a public university entered a faculty 
meeting disputing the layoff of a particular professor. Although the student 
was told to leave, he stayed, disrupting the meeting. The president of the 
university subsequently expelled him. The Court explained that the 
president had discretionary power to choose what type of disposition 
would apply to this student.
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In a 1977 decision, the Court held that the customs through the 
ordinary course of business enabled the business to use discretionary 
power to render administrative dispositions. 72 Further, these customs 
allowed the business to select procedures for disciplinary dismissals. In 
this case, three plaintiffs took on the role of leading the labor union 
activities and, in doing so, disrupted the ordinary course of business of the 
customs. Their case was dismissed.73
The Court has not chosen between the Kouka Sairyou and Youken 
Sairyou theories. Unlike the U.S., Japanese environmental law went 
through legal reform after World War II. These decisions may have been 
based on mainstream theory prior to the current Constitution known as the 
“special power relationship theory.” 74 Under this theory, without 
legislation to support it, the government can restrict the freedom or rights 
of a person under a special power relationship such as in the case of public 
schools or jails, and a remedy from the judiciary is unavailable. Although 
it is true that, in the name of discretionary power, these decisions may have 
denied or limited the scope of judicial review, a certain kind of special 
power relationship may have existed.
F. Purpose Review
The judiciary holds the arbitrary and capricious exercise of 
discretionary power of administrative agencies to be illegal. There are 
several standards for judicial review of administrative discretion. One such 
standard is “purpose review.” These standards are similar to those in the 
U.S.
The Court used purpose review in 1978.75 In this case, the plaintiff 
applied to Yamagata Prefecture for permission to build private rooms with 
baths under the Public Bath Act. 76 At the time, there were business entities 
that operated this kind of bath facility for sexual service purposes.77 In 
May 1968, citizens initiated a movement against the construction of these 
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types of buildings. 78 Yome City in Yamagata Prefecture preferred to 
establish a public park for children near this site and the Entertainment and 
Amusement Trades Control Act79 prohibited private rooms with baths 
within 200 metres of such parks. The prefecture approved the city’s 
application for a public park within 134 metres from the private rooms in 
June 1968. In August, the plaintiff started the business, and in February 
1969, the management was suspended and the business was prosecuted.
The Japanese Supreme Court held for the plaintiff.80 The purpose of 
the Child Welfare Act was to promote children’s welfare by providing 
opportunities for safe and healthy play in a park. The hidden motivation 
of the government was to prevent the management of a business for private 
rooms with baths. In this case, because there was no necessity in granting 
permission for a public children’s park, the plaintiff was entitled to operate 
the business.81
III. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN JAPAN AFTER 2011
Nuclear power plant cases illustrate how Japanese Courts review an 
administrative agency’s actions, especially when reviewing public health 
and safety. People outside Japan might wonder why Japan reactivated its 
nuclear power plants after the disaster in 2011.
Prior to the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2010, the Basic Energy 
Plan aimed at promoting nuclear power plants from a ratio of 31.3% to 
around 50%. As of February 2011, fifty-four nuclear power plants were 
working to generate electricity. On the date of the Great East Japan 
Earthquake, Units 1–3 of the nuclear power plants were stopped, and Unit 
4 experienced a hydrogen explosion, damaging buildings and housing 
reactors around it. After the earthquake, Japanese nuclear power plants 
were reviewed once every thirteen months. In May 2012, every nuclear 
power plant stopped operating at least once in Japan.
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A. Government Policy Changes after the Great East Japan Earthquake
In 2012, the parliament amended the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear 
Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors.82 The amendment to 
the Act restricted the operational terms of nuclear power plants to forty
years. In September 2012, the Conference on Energy and Environmental 
Issues held by the cabinet published a report formulating the strategy on 
revolutionary energy and environment.83 It clearly announced that in the 
future, society would not depend on nuclear power plants; specifically, 
operations limited to forty years should be observed rigidly, and only those 
passing the approval of the Nuclear Regulation Authority may be allowed 
to be activated again.84 Applicants seeking permission to extend operational 
terms would be required to submit reports to the nuclear regulatory 
authority.
The industrial world strongly criticized the report.85 Accordingly, the 
cabinet could not conclude that it was a cabinet decision but left it as an 
advisory report.86 In December 2012, the election of the House of the 
Representatives was held, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) gained 
power.
The Shinzo Abe cabinet took another look at the agenda of the former 
administration’s policy. The LDP changed the previous policy for nuclear 
power plant operations. The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
initiated discussions on basic energy plans and established a new committee 
consisting of experts.
The Abe cabinet announced a Basic Energy Plan in 2014. The plan 
minimized dependence on nuclear power but did not abolish it because 
nuclear energy was the base of electric power for Japan. The nuclear power 
plant, with new safety regulations, would be reactivated.87 The reference 
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goal establishes the ratio of renewable power to grow up to twenty percent
by 2030.
The fast-breeder nuclear reactor, Monju, was to be reactivated as a 
center of international research. In 2013, around 10,000 defects were 
found, and testing was prohibited. In 2016, the Japanese government 
decided to abolish this reactor.
B. Monju and Ikata Decisions to Reboot Nuclear Power Plants
The Monju decision is one of the leading cases of nuclear reactor 
permission.88 In 1980, the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development 
Corporation applied to the Prime Minister seeking permission for the 
establishment of the Monju reactor, which the Prime Minister granted. The 
local residents brought an administrative action to revoke the 
administrative disposition and also brought a civil action to seek an 
injunction against the building and operation of the Monju reactor. In 
1992, the Japanese Supreme Court approved standing of the local residents 
and remanded the case to the lower court. In 2005, the Supreme Court 
heard the case again and vacated the lower court decision supporting the 
illegality of the grant of permission for the Monju reactor.89
The Japanese Supreme Court reviewed several issues, first deciding
that local residents were permitted to bring a suit seeking the revocation 
of administrative disposition under Article 9 of JACLA. 90 The Court 
explained that the statute provided standing for the revocation of 
administrative disposition. Specifically, the term “legal interest” requires 
the Court to review purpose, which includes the content and character of 
which the statute at issue aims to protect. Further, the Court is required to 
examine whether or not the statute at issue protects the concrete interest of 
the general public, as well as individual interests.
The Court also decided that a plaintiff may bring a civil suit to seek an 
injunction in the interest of a personal right. If the plaintiff brings a civil 
suit, administrative litigation is still available. Article 3791 of JACLA 
provides standing to sue in an action for the declaration of nullity, etc. The 
Court explained that in this case, the local residents brought a civil action 
to seek an injunction; thereby, their civil action was not the equivalent of 
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an administrative litigation under Article 36 92 of JACLA. The Court 
explained that it would ask which avenue, civil litigation or administrative 
litigation, was direct and appropriate.93 Although a local resident brought 
civil action, it did not prohibit administrative litigation.
The Court analyzed the safety review of an administrative agency for 
the permission of a nuclear reactor. 94 The Court followed the Ikata
decision of 1992 and decided it was unreasonable to determine all safety 
review items.95 Further, the Court should respect the reasonable decision 
of its Ministry based on the expert opinions of the Nuclear Safety 
Commission (NSC). The Act authorizes the Ministry to give permission 
and provide judgment because they consider the advisory opinion of the 
NSC. The Court defers to the Ministry unless a decision is rendered 
unreasonable based on clear, erroneous deliberation and processes within 
the NSC.
The justices respected the Ministry’s judgment based on the expert 
opinions from professionals in the fields of science and technology. With 
respect to safety reviews, the advisory committee reviewed the 
measurements for dose reduction in order to avoid potential risks of 
nuclear substances emitted by the regular operation of a nuclear plant.96
Further, precautionary measurements were enacted in order to avoid 
potential risks of nuclear substances and natural disasters.97 Nonetheless, 
the Japanese Supreme Court did not relinquish control over reviewing the 
Ministry.
Of utmost concern in this case is how much the Court defers in its 
judgment to administrative agency discretion. The answer as to why 
judges defer to this source may be expert and democratic accountability.98
In the parliamentary system, the Prime Minister is selected from the 
members of the Diet under Article 67(1) 99 and then certified by the 
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Emperor under Article 7 100 of the Japanese Constitution. The Prime 
Minister appoints the Ministry with certification of the Emperor under 
Articles 7 and 68(1).101 The certification of the Emperor is ceremonial.
C. Comparison with the Chevron Doctrine and Ikata Again
The U.S. court system and governmental structure significantly differs
from the Japanese system.102 A simple comparison would not be prudent 
without addressing the substantial variations between governmental 
structures. Nonetheless, the U.S. and the Japanese Supreme Courts do not 
fully exercise substantial and procedural review of administrative agency 
decisions.
One famous U.S. Supreme Court decision, Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. 
NRDC, is based on deference to the interpretation of law by an 
administrative agency (the Chevron doctrine).103 The Chevron doctrine 
employs two steps: (1) the Court reviews whether the statutory language 
is clear and, if it is, the Courts rejects the administrative agency 
interpretation; and (2) if the statute is ambiguous, the Court defers to 
administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretation.104
In recent cases, there have been some limitations in the Chevron
doctrine. For example, in Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency,
the Court considered step two of the Chevron doctrine but rejected the 
administrative agency’s interpretation.105 It is more difficult to predict how 
the Roberts Court will utilize the Chevron doctrine rather than how the 
Rehnquist Court adjudicated in the past. There may be a need for future 
review of the steps in the Chevron doctrine as the Court reviews additional 
interpretations of administrative agencies. There is potential for the U.S.
Supreme Court to modify steps of the Chevron doctrine. Otherwise, the 
doctrine might serve as a combination of traditional interpretative tools. In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the interpretation of a statute by an administrative 
agency changed with a change in presidency.106 The Court applied step 
one from the Chevron doctrine.
It appears that both Japanese and U.S. court systems reserve the power 
of judicial review, utilizing judicial power to announce what law is 
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conferred to the judiciary by the Constitution. In both countries, the 
concepts of expertise and democratic accountability are legitimized; and,
in the U.S., the Court demonstrated this in the Chevron doctrine.
In the Roberts Court, the Chevron doctrine is seen as winding down 
in its development. Accordingly, the Japanese Court cannot solely depend 
on expertise and democratic accountability as a means to defer all 
judgments to an administrative agency. The judiciary is required to justify 
its decisions to the people as a way to secure their trust.
As demonstrated in the U.S. by the Chevron doctrine and the ruling in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the interpretation of a statute by an administrative 
agency can change when a new president is elected into office. Similarly, 
in Japan, the energy policy changed from the Democratic Party to LDP in 
2012; and its effects on the nuclear plant policy were seen by decisions 
made under the Abe cabinet.107
In Japan, in terms of democratic legitimacy of the agency, the Diet 
established the Nuclear Regulation Authority by statute as an 
administrative agency where the cabinet appoints its committee.108 There 
are four committee members. The Prime Minister selects the Chairman 
who represents the authority with the consent of both Houses of the Diet.109
We may observe a similar process for the head of the administrative 
agency, explaining, in part, the democratic legitimacy of an administrative 
agency. Both U.S. and Japanese Courts might use a “hard look” approach, 
thereby not giving up judicial review that is granted by their respective 
Constitutions. As in Massachusetts v. EPA, judges face unfamiliar issues 
in areas requiring scientific expertise, with a probability of worst-case
scenarios to determine how much the court defers in matters such as 
nuclear power reactor meltdowns.
As noted above, the Japanese Supreme Court hears administrative 
litigation where the plaintiff seeks to revoke permission for the 
construction of new coal power plants.110 Judicial review is required for 
the administrative disposition of whether permission is granted or not. For 
permission of coal or nuclear power plants, the electric company needs to 
go through an environment assessment for impact. Coal power plants are 
required to submit an environmental impact assessment that includes
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alternative plans.111 They must take into consideration the location, size, 
structure, and allocation of the building. The Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry (METI) considers the advice of the Ministry of Environment 
and reviews the assessment.112 The ministerial ordinance mandates that the 
environmental impact assessment provide several alternative proposals in
regards to location, assignment, structure, and scale of the plant. In the 
planning phase, factors that may cause significant impacts are to be 
selected. The guidelines113 under the administrative regulations exclude 
alternative plans for fuels on the ground; specifically, the government 
thinks that the fuels would be fixed into one from the perspective of energy 
security and management strategy.114
Thus, administrative regulations for coal power plants evaluate any 
significant environmental impacts, but not in the case of CO2. By 
implementing the best available technology for thermal efficiency, the 
guideline of the METI explains that CO2 is not considered in its evaluation.
Today, some nuclear power plants are going through reactivation 
reviews, or decisions are being made regarding decommissioning nuclear 
reactors. There are exceptions for a few working nuclear power plants, 
such as Kawauchi Unit 2 in Kyushu, and Units 3 and 4 of Takahama in 
Kansai.
Local citizens recently brought a civil action to seek a provisional 
injunction against the operation of nuclear power plants in Japan.115 In 
civil actions, local residents seek temporary injunctions against the 
operation of coal power plants by asserting that it infringes on both their 
personal and environmental rights.116
In January 2018, in the Ikata nuclear power plant case, the Hiroshima 
High Court ruled on a request for a provisional injunction against the 
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operation of Unit 3 of the Ikata nuclear power plant.117 The Hiroshima 
High Court recognized potential catastrophic eruption of a volcano near 
the nuclear plant stating that a pyroclastic flow by eruption would reach 
the Ikata nuclear power plant. The Hiroshima High Court reviewed safety 
issues by following a volcano impact assessment guideline, which was 
established by the administrative agency. Before this case, the Hiroshima 
District Court and the Miyazaki branch of the Fukuoka High Court
rejected the injunction.118
The ministerial guideline estimates the risk of an active volcano within 
a radius of 160 kilometers from a nuclear power plant along with the 
possibility of volcanic activity. If within range, it presumes the magnitude 
of eruption and reviews the probability of pyroclastic flow reaching the 
power plant. Volcanologists are concerned with an administrative agency 
establishing the volcano impact assessments. While drafting this guideline, 
the administrative agency needs to consider expert perspectives, utilizing an 
observation network that is able to detect volcanic expansion before 
eruption and be able to move nuclear fuel to a safe place. However, other 
experts argue that this monitoring may not precisely predict eruption using 
today's science and technology. Catastrophic disasters may occur not only
in a nuclear power plant site but also in any site in Japan. It is still unclear 
how the Supreme Court in Japan reviews guidelines for a volcano impact 
assessment.
Both Japanese and U.S. Courts empower administrative agencies to 
exercise discretionary power established by statute. It might be surprising 
to review the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, where the Court
concluded that CO2 is an air pollutant.119 Unlike in the U.S., shaping policy 
through litigation used to be unfamiliar to Japanese people, who make 
decisions on how to assess and accept accidental risk by natural disaster.
People may change governmental policies through voting. Otherwise, 
people may bring litigation to the Court to change administrative 
dispositions. In this process, the judiciary in Japan is required to show its 
authority through its decisions.
CONCLUSION
The Great East Japan Earthquake occurred on March 11, 2011 in 
Fukushima, after which nuclear power plants were shut down. People 
outside of Japan often wonder why Japan recently reactivated the nuclear 
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power plant, but the explanation can be seen from the perspective of 
environmental law.
Administrative discretion is defined as the power and authority of an 
administrative agency to set regulatory standards or to make 
administrative decisions within the scope set forth in its enabling 
legislation or other statutes. The grounds for administrative discretionary 
power are agency expertise and policy judgment.
Today, under Article 30 of the JACLA, Japanese Courts can revoke 
an original administrative disposition when it exceeds the agency’s 
discretionary power or when there is an abuse of such power.120
Studies on Japanese environmental law focus on cases in which 
administrative dispositions have been determined by the Courts to be 
beyond the limits of discretionary power, or an abuse of such power. It is 
very similar to studies on U.S. environmental law, where U.S. Courts use 
the Chevron doctrine, or review arbitrary or capricious fact-finding of an 
administrative agency under the Administrative Procedure Act.
In the Ikata decision of 1992, the Japanese Supreme Court explained 
that the power of an administrative agency could be discretionary, but not 
unfettered, as it is still under judicial review.121 Further, when a disposition 
based on discretionary power infringes upon human health and safety, the 
judiciary will take a hard look at such a disposition. The Court noted that 
it would respect the expertise of the administrative agency.
The Ikata decision of 1992 established a framework for the review of 
cases involving the safety of nuclear power reactors in Japan. The 
judiciary did not use the term scientific “discretion” in its decision, 
probably because it was attempting to distinguish discretion based on 
policy from that based on expertise.
In 2012, a year after the Great East Japan Earthquake, the government 
changed its policy on energy and environmental issues. The Abe 
government stated that the power plan minimized dependence on nuclear 
power, but did not abolish it because the government declared that nuclear 
energy was the base of electric power for Japan.122
Recently, local citizens brought a civil action to seek a provisional 
injunction against the operation of nuclear power plants in Japan. The 
Japanese judiciary is now facing how judges may make policy for the 
                                                                                                            
120. Gyousei Jiken Soshouhou [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 
59 of 2015, art. 30 (Japan).
121. Abe, supra note 97, at 254-56. (Abe strongly argued administrative 
discretion is under judicial review. The Judiciary should review the fact finding 
of an administrative agency if it is related to human health.)
122. AGENCY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY, Cabinet Decision on 
the New Strategic Energy Plan, MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
(July 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/K3ET-69MW (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
78 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VII
future of energy in part and allocate burdens of proof to citizens or 
administrative agencies. It is easy for judges to say that science is beyond 
their understanding, as the risk of volcanic eruption is based on research 
of seismologists.
Judges should not make policy judgments and may defer to the 
expertise of administrative agencies, as it is not common for litigation to 
shape policy in Japan. Nonetheless, judges are still obligated to review 
safety standards and damage to the lives and health of the people. Japanese 
administrative law researchers and legal professionals need to remain 
vigilant in policing the proper role of Japan’s judiciary.
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